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T
ort liability for personal injuries and property dam-
age caused by products is known as product liability. 
Among the most prominent products associated with 
product liability claims are pharmaceuticals, medical 
devices, private aircraft, automobiles, and cigarettes. 
Damages awarded to injured parties raise the costs of provid-
ing the product, thus increasing the costs to the firm of selling 
unsafe products. In theory, where the damages equal the value 
of the harm, the damages payment leads the firm to internal-
ize the costs of the harm and creates incentives for the firm 
to produce safer products. In this article I focus primarily on 
whether American product liability law does in fact enhance 
product safety. 
Posing the question of whether product liability law is safety-
enhancing does not, however, imply that this framing of the 
mission of product liability is appropriate. Higher levels of safety 
may not be desirable. For almost all products, it does not make 
economic sense to ensure that products are risk-free. Rather, 
from the standpoint of economic efficiency, for continuous safety 
choices the penalties established through tort liability should 
provide financial incentives for firms to provide the products 
that achieve a level of risk that equates the incremental benefits of 
greater safety with the incremental costs. Thus, if the safety level 
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Does Product Liability 
Make Us Safer?
Adverse consequences arise from problems with the judicial 
system and jurors’ judgment biases. 
By W. KiP VisCusi Vanderbilt University
of the product falls short of the efficient level, product liability 
can potentially play a productive role by penalizing firms for a 
shortfall between the level of product safety provided and the 
efficient level of safety, thus pushing the level of safety closer to 
its efficient level. 
This task of establishing efficient incentives for product 
safety is not limited to a point in time. As technological change 
evolves over time, firms should continue to improve their prod-
ucts to maintain this benefit-cost balance. Technological change 
generally will lead to enhanced safety levels in any given product 
if the changes involve innovations that decrease the costs of 
providing safer products. If the cost of providing a given level 
of safety decreases, then the firm will find it efficient to improve Ill
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the safety of the product. 
However, technological change also may lead to the introduc-
tion of new products posing novel risks. Whether product liabil-
ity will make products safer is a question that should be framed 
more broadly in terms of whether product liability also fosters 
the introduction of welfare-enhancing new products. The court’s 
task of assessing innovative products often entails more problem-
atic judgments than with assessments of existing technologies, 
so that the concern for safety with respect to innovations may in 
fact stymie such innovations. Novel products may be safer than 
existing products but may pose new kinds of risks. If there is a 
bias of product liability against novel risks, then there will be a 
disincentive with respect to product innovations. 
A review of the empirical evidence and case studies on the 
role of product liability demonstrates that the idealized world 
in which the tort liability system is supposed to produce effi-
cient levels of safety is not how product liability law actually 
performs. As I will demonstrate, the report card on the perfor-
mance of product liability law is mixed. In some instances tort 
liability does serve a potentially risk-reducing role by fostering 
new safety measures. However, the safety-enhancing role of 
liability fails to be realized in general because of fundamental 
deficiencies in product liability law and the way such cases are 
handled by the courts. In particular, courts make excessive and 
unpredictable awards and stumble when faced with uncertain-
ties. New products posing uncertain risks are especially hard hit 
so that product liability often serves as a barrier to innovations 
that would reduce accidents. 
The Efficient Safety Reference Point
In a simple economic framework in which firms have constant 
unit costs of production, providing products with a higher level 
of safety will result in a higher level of unit costs for the prod-
uct. In the case of competitive markets, the additional costs 
associated with safer products will raise unit cost levels, which 
in turn will raise the price of the product purchased by con-
sumers by an amount equal to the cost of greater safety. Thus 
consumers are, in effect, purchasing a product liability insur-
ance policy as part of a bundled product. Whether consumer 
welfare is enhanced by greater safety or whether the additional 
safety is excessive from consumers’ standpoint depends on 
whether consumers value the safety improvements more than 
the increased product price. 
The role of product liability law in the economy should be 
quite selective, since market forces will foster safer products so 
that safety levels are not generally awry. Indeed, there is no useful 
function of product liability law if markets function perfectly. In 
a well-functioning market, firms will deliver products that have 
an efficient level of safety even in the absence of product liability 
law. This result assumes that consumers are fully informed of the 
risks and consequences of their product choices, in which case 
consumer preferences as expressed in the marketplace will generate 
the desired mix of products and levels of safety that reflect consum-
ers’ valuation of the risk and consequently the associated benefits 
of safety. If safer products are desirable, consumers will be willing 
to pay more for these products and companies will produce them. Ill
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For product liability law to serve a constructive role from the 
standpoint of setting the efficient level of product risk, there 
must be some form of market failure, such as inadequate con-
sumer knowledge of the risks. The presence of product-related 
injuries is not sufficient for concluding that there is an inad-
equate level of safety. In a typical personal injury case with an 
identifiable victim, the probability of harm may appear to be 1.0 
ex post since the consumer was in fact injured, but what matters 
is the level of the risk ex ante across the entire population of con-
sumers of the product. In judging whether there is a shortcoming 
in risk beliefs, the task is to ascertain what a reasonable consumer 
would have anticipated as the probability of harm, not whether 
the injured consumer was clairvoyant and anticipated that there 
would definitely be an injury.
Whether risk beliefs are accurate depends both on the level of 
the risk and the degree to which people have information about 
the risk. Certainly it is rarely the case that people know the exact 
probabilities of harm from different products. Products often 
pose multiple risks, and understanding all these hazards may 
require detailed technical expertise. However, the appropriate 
task for consumers is to have a sufficient understanding of 
the multiple risks of the product so that they would assess the 
expected cost imposed by the harms as being as severe as they 
would in a situation of perfect information. 
That consumers do not have perfect risk beliefs does not nec-
essarily imply that there is a market failure. Errors in risk beliefs 
are not random. Many systematic patterns have been identified 
in the empirical literature on risk beliefs. A pertinent empirical 
phenomenon is that people tend to overestimate small mortality 
risks, such as the risk of dying from botulism, and underestimate 
very large risks, such as the lifetime risk of heart disease from all 
causes. For the most part, product risks tend to involve small 
probabilities of serious adverse outcomes, and consequently 
people will exhibit a tendency toward risk overestimation of 
product-related risks. 
Problems of risk underestimation will be more pronounced 
for hidden risks. The presence of benzene in Perrier that was 
discovered in 1990 is a well-known example of a risk that had 
formerly been hidden, but this is not a unique situation. Medical 
patients may not be aware of adverse drug interactions that are not 
disclosed to the patient and cannot be determined by the patient 
based on personal experience or other information sources. The 
locus of areas in which government regulation or product liability 
can play a constructive role will depend on the nature of the risk 
and what consumers know about the risk. In particular, if there is 
asymmetric information in which the manufacturer is informed 
but consumers are not, then government regulation—such as 
required disclosure of information—may be warranted.
Liability Criteria
The first question is when liability should be imposed, and this 
will depend on the context of the product’s use. For concrete-
ness, I will concentrate on products purchased by a consumer 
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in a market context, where the potential injury is to the con-
sumer. Whether consumers understand the risk to themselves 
is a pivotal concern. Consumers will be willing to pay less for 
products that may cause them harm. Products may also injure 
third parties who are not involved in a business relationship 
with the producer. Thus defective brakes or acceleration prob-
lems with a car could lead to harm to pedestrians or other driv-
ers’ vehicles. To the extent that these harms are subsequently 
internalized by the product purchaser through tort liability, 
the consumer in turn will incorporate the cost of such harms 
in the purchase decision. There can, of course, be exceptional 
cases that are not adequately addressed either by the market 
or tort liability, as when firms scale back tort liability claims 
through bankruptcy proceedings.
The structure of standard liability rules can potentially lead to 
efficient levels of safety. Under a negligence standard, firms will 
only be liable for product-related injury costs if the level of safety 
that they provide is below the legal standard. If that standard is 
set at the economically efficient level of safety for the product, 
the failure to meet the standard will lead firms to pay injured 
parties for the cost of the accident, leading the firm to internal-
ize these costs, which in turn will provide subsequent incentives 
for the firm to provide products with levels of safety that meet 
the standard. 
The economic analysis for strict liability is simpler as there is 
no need to set the standard at an efficient level. Since firms will 
pay for all accident costs, the firm internalizes all safety losses 
associated with the product and consequently will provide an 
efficient level of safety. However, consumers will not have any 
incentive to exercise care, to choose safe products, or to match 
their product choices with their own safety-related productiv-
ity if all accident costs are borne by the firm. Standard law and 
economics prescriptions generally couple strict liability with a 
contributory negligence standard. 
Liability and Risk Trends 
The rise of product liability costs and, in particular, the emer-
gence of occasional product liability “crises” would be consis-
tent with an underlying soundly functioning liability regime 
if an increase in product risks accounted for the high liability 
costs. However, by almost every measure the United States has 
become safer over the past century and accident rate trends 
bear no apparent relation to surges in liability costs. Total unin-
tentional injury death rates have declined for over a century. 
Data going back almost a century are available for individual 
component risks such as work-related deaths, home-related 
deaths, accidental deaths from firearms, and other risks, and 
these hazards also have declined from their levels 80 years ago. 
The principal exception is that the number of motor-vehicle 
deaths and motor-vehicle death rates are higher than they 
were a century ago. However, the number of cars in use and the 
usage of these cars have risen dramatically over time. Adjust-
ing for intensity of use, motor-vehicle risks have plummeted 
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The profitability problems of insurance are more pronounced for 
bodily injury coverage, as is the variability in loss ratios, which in 
turn will create more highly variable premiums and uncertainty 
for the affected industries.
The high loss ratios and substantial variability of loss ratios 
for bodily injury coverage in the 1980s contributed to the tort 
liability crisis of that era. Insurers responded by raising insur-
ance rates and, in some extreme instances, denying coverage. In 
addition, to the extent that the fluctuation in insured losses 
reflects loss trends more generally, the uninsured costs will 
exhibit similar fluctuations. 
After the passage of a series of tort liability reforms in the mid-
1980s to contain damage awards, insurance loss ratios stabilized. 
For general liability, there were widespread reform efforts as 12 
states enacted reforms to control liability costs in 1985, 22 states 
enacted reforms in 1986, and 12 states enacted reforms in 1987. 
Whereas general liability loss ratios formerly had exceeded 1.0, 
in 1986 and subsequent years loss ratios decreased to levels that 
stabilized around 0.8.
The costs of liability imposed on insurers are but one manifes-
tation of the costs borne by firms. To assess the liability costs for 
firms, Joni Hersch and I undertook a stock market event study 
of 29 product liability lawsuits. Such studies seek to determine 
statistically the effect of different events, such as major court 
decisions, on a firm’s stock price after taking into account longer-
run trends and other factors. The awards against companies were 
associated with a significant decline in stock market price relative 
to similar firms. It is also noteworthy that newspaper reports of 
pending lawsuits also led to negative returns as investors began 
to anticipate the adverse effects of product liability.
Innovation and New Product Development
The costs imposed by product liability law might serve a use-
ful deterrence function if they provide incentives for firms to 
change their products to make them safer or for firms to dis-
continue products that are so unsafe that they should not be 
marketed. These effects flow from the basic economic theory 
and the structure of product liability law. However, the pres-
ence of substantial uncertainty in liability costs will tend to 
mute these effects, and there is no assurance that jury decisions 
will provide the right signals to firms. 
Determining whether and how product liability affects prod-
uct design are empirical issues, and the results are not encourag-
ing. A useful proxy for assessing whether product liability law 
from 33.38 deaths per 10,000 vehicles in 1913 to 1.51 deaths 
per 10,000 vehicles in 2008. Similarly, the death rate per 100 
million miles has decreased from 21.65 in 1923 to 1.33 in 2008. 
Despite the high levels of safety and continued improvements 
in safety, product-related insurance costs remain high. The value 
of net premiums in 2008 was $1.3 billion for aircraft liability, $2.8 
billion for product liability and $38.6 billion for other liability 
including industry coverages for negligence, carelessness, or fail-
ure to act. Many large firms also self-insure so that examination 
of insurance premiums alone 
understates the cost of product 
liability to firms throughout 
the economy.
Longer-term trends in liabil-
ity reflect factors other than 
safety levels alone. As society 
has become wealthier, we have 
become less willing to accept 
risk. Advances in technology also can increase liability levels if 
the standards for what constitutes reasonable care have changed. 
These long-run trends do not, however, account for very 
abrupt shifts in the level of liability. A puzzle noted by law pro-
fessor George Priest is that, within specific time periods in which 
product liability premiums have exhibited sharp increases, there 
is no apparent increase in product risk levels to account for the 
increase. There is therefore a mismatch between the surges in 
liability costs associated with the tort liability crisis in the mid-
1980s and the level of product-related risks. The periodic upward 
shifts in liability costs bear no apparent relation to increased 
levels of product riskiness.
The problems posed by product liability insurance are related 
both to the level of liability insurance costs and their variability, 
which creates substantial uncertainty for the firm. The absence 
of predictable liability costs will make it difficult for firms to 
distinguish which safety investments are worthwhile and which 
are not. This problem is much more acute for bodily injury losses 
than property losses. The main index of insurer profitability is 
the loss ratio, which is the ratio of losses to premiums. Ignoring 
the role of interest earned on premiums that are invested, a loss 
ratio above 1.0 implies that the insurer is losing money, and a loss 
ratio below 1.0 implies that the insurer is making money on the 
policies it has written. Thus the loss ratio is an inverse measure 
of insurer profitability. The bodily injury component of liability 
exhibited much higher loss ratios and more variable loss ratios 
than did the property damages component throughout the 
liability crisis period.
In a competitive market that has reached long-run equilib-
rium, one would expect insurer profitability as measured by the 
insurance loss ratios to be equalized across industries and for 
different kinds of insurance coverage—assuming other reason-
able conditions are met, including a similar distribution over 
time in the occurrence of the losses. However, there is evidence 
of substantial variation in terms of the level of the loss ratios 
as well as the variability across industries and within industries. 
Longer-term trends in liability reflect factors other 
than safety levels alone. As society has become 
wealthier, we have become less willing to accept risk.
C o n s u m e r  p r o t e C t i o n
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enhances product safety is to see if it stimulates the development 
of new, possibly safer products. There have been two regres-
sion analysis studies at the firm level of the overall relationship 
between product liability and product innovation, neither of 
which found effects that supported the textbook paradigm of 
higher liability costs fostering the introduction of safer prod-
ucts. Similarly, there has been one regression analysis study of 
decreases in the role of product liability and it showed that such 
changes did not undermine safety but instead may have had the 
opposite effect.
Novel risks have been found to be harder hit by liability costs 
than more familiar hazards. Michael J. Moore and I examined the 
effect of product characteristics on liability costs as well as the 
effect of liability costs on research and development. Industries 
that have a high rate of technological change or that have a high 
patent rate have high shares of liability costs relative to sales for 
the firm. In contrast, industries where the firms have made no 
new product introductions have lower bodily injury liability costs. 
These relationships are consistent with the view that the courts 
dislike novel technologies. 
The study also found that increased product liability has 
a nonlinear effect on innovation. Low levels of liability boost 
investments in novel technologies, but this effect tapers off and 
eventually becomes reversed and turns negative at very high levels 
of bodily injury costs relative to sales. Thus, at very high levels of 
liability costs, product liability has a counterproductive effect. 
A subsequent study by the same authors, using a different 
measure of effects on innovation, found that liability costs 
initially boost product research and development but then sub-
sequently decrease R&D at very high levels of liability costs. The 
liability costs/sales variable is associated with higher product 
R&D investments at low levels of costs, but it eventually becomes 
reversed for high liability costs. Sorting out causality remains dif-
ficult, but the evidence is suggestive of a positive relation between 
liability costs and safety that holds only for low levels of costs.
These results suggest that product liability’s aversion to new 
technologies has been harmful. At substantial levels of liability 
costs, the net effect of liability is to shut down innovation and 
discourage new product introductions. This is not the case at 
low and moderate levels of liability costs, where product liabil-
ity promotes R&D for new products and leads to new product 
introductions. However, even here new product introductions 
may not be warranted on benefit-cost grounds. This is because 
it is not clear whether consumers would be willing to pay the 
extra cost for the safety improvements. We lack data to permit 
such judgments on an overall basis. What we do know is that 
extremely high liability costs appear to have counterproductive 
effects as they impose substantial costs but discourage changes in 
products and new product research. Withdrawing products from 
the market or choosing not to introduce new products often 
becomes the most desirable course in the presence of substantial 
expected liability costs.
New safety technologies should of course be encouraged, 
and these results are therefore troubling. If product liability was 
meant to reduce risk, it seems to have failed in its mission. Strik-
ingly, one study found that reducing tort liability makes us safer. 
An empirical analysis by Paul Rubin and Joanna Shepherd found 
that the enactment of noneconomic damages caps and product 
liability reform were among the measures associated with a 
decrease in the non–motor vehicle accidental death rate over the 
1981–2000 period for states that implemented those measures as 
compared to states that did not. On balance, tort reform led to a 
reduction of 24,000 deaths over the two-decade period. Reduc-
tions in liability costs enhance safety. 
Punitive Damages 
Punitive damages often combine two elements that tend to 
reduce the efficacy of product liability as a safety incentive pro-
motion device. The awards often tend to be very large. As we saw, 
very large damages amounts tend to have a counterproduc-
tive effect in that they serve to reduce R&D on new products, 
diminish new product introductions, and lead to withdrawal of 
more novel or risky products from the market. The second dif-
ficulty with punitive damages is their tremendous uncertainty 
and unpredictability. If firms cannot anticipate what financial 
sanctions they will incur for various product designs, there will 
not be the clearcut incentive guidance needed to foster efficient 
risk levels.
The enormous scale and financial uncertainty associated with 
punitive damages is borne out in “blockbuster punitive damages 
awards,” or punitive damages awards of at least $100 million. As 
of 2008 there had been 100 such awards that reached or exceeded 
the $100 million threshold. Even within the blockbuster punitive 
damages award grouping, there is tremendous variability in the 
award amounts, which reach as high as $145 billion in Engle v. R.J. 
Reynolds, a cigarette class action case in Florida. 
These awards do not reflect any sense of what is appropri-
ate from the standpoint of establishing efficient levels of safety. 
Although law-and-economics models generally envision a deter-
rence role for punitive damages only in cases with a probability 
of detection below 1.0 (where compensatory damages might not 
adequately deter because some harms are undetected), puni-
tive awards bear little relation to any meaningful principles for 
establishing safety incentives. To the extent that the awards are 
designed by jurors to punish the company or “send it a message,” 
there will be associated fixed costs incurred by the company, but 
these awards tend not to impose the kinds of costs that can be 
reflected in the expected costs of production and hence will not 
serve as a safety incentive mechanism.
Table 1 provides a breakdown of the distribution of the block-
buster punitive damages awards. With the exception of seven 
awards for violent crimes, the defendant in these blockbuster 
cases is a firm in one of the designated industry groups. Most of 
the industry cases are product-related. There are, of course, some 
notable exceptions, such as awards for fraud against the finance, 
investment, and insurance industry group, and the award for 
the Exxon Valdez oil spill that affects the energy and chemical 
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industry tally. However, most of the industry group awards can 
be traced to product-related risks.
The automobile, cigarette, and pharmaceutical awards all 
involve products. While one automobile case (BMW of North Amer-
ica Inc. v. Gore) involved the repainting of car doors, the other cases 
involved deaths and serious injuries associated with motor vehicles. 
Because these cases tended to involve claims of design defects for 
which the risks were not apparent at the time of sale, the liability 
costs associated with these punitive damages could not be inter-
nalized. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that firms would 
anticipate punitive damages awards in excess of $100 million.
The five blockbuster awards against the cigarette industry 
that are shown in Table 1 are all for individual smoker harms. 
The class action case in the outlier Engle award is the sixth 
blockbuster case affecting the cigarette industry, and is not 
included in Table 1 since it is such a large award that it would 
distort the mean award levels. Because there is a latency period 
of decades before smoking risks become apparent, the cigarettes 
involved in these cases were marketed long before there were 
any such blockbuster punitive damages awards, as the first such 
blockbuster punitive damages award in any context was in 1985. 
Moreover, since the cigarette industry had never paid damages 
in any smoking case until after the 1998 Master Settlement 
Agreement, firms would not have incorporated the subsequent 
liability costs into the product price at the time of sale since the 
costs presumably were not anticipated at the time of sale. Thus, 
from the standpoint of safety incentives, there is a mismatch 
between the imposition of the blockbuster punitive damages 
awards and the formation of corporate expectations and prod-
uct safety decisions that could ultimately affect the likelihood 
and level of such awards.
The tremendous uncertainty posed by large and unpredict-
able punitive damages awards has attracted the attention of 
the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court’s decision in State Farm v. 
Campbell suggested that there be a single-digit upper bound on 
the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages, and 
for maritime cases the Court subsequently suggested a usual 
upper bound ratio of 1:1 in Exxon Shipping Co. et al. v. Baker. These 
guidelines are not necessarily binding and they do not serve to 
put punitive damages on fully rational footing. As with all such 
soft or binding caps, the proposal that there be some kind of rigid 
mathematical structure that is not informed by a sound basis for 
setting punitive damages does not address the more fundamental 
problem that juries do not have guidelines for mapping their 
concerns into dollar damages amounts. 
A series of experimental studies by Cass Sunstein et al. has 
documented numerous shortcomings in jury behavior, some of 
which will be discussed below with respect to specific problems 
that arise with respect to product liability cases. But the fun-
damental problem is that juries are being asked to determine 
whether punitive damages are warranted and, if so, to set the 
magnitude of these awards without any specific guidance as to 
how their assessment of the defendant’s behavior should relate 
to the dollar value of the award.
As with product liability generally, whether punitive dam-
ages do have a deterrent effect ultimately is an empirical ques-
tion. In an examination of differences in risk levels between 
states that permit punitive damages awards and those that do 
not, I found no evidence of such a deterrent influence. The risk 
categories examined included toxic chemical accidents, toxic 
chemical accidents involving injury or death, toxic chemical 
releases, surface water discharges of chemicals, total chemical 
releases in surface water, medical misadventure deaths, total 
accidental deaths, total insurance premiums, medical malprac-
tice insurance premiums, product liability 
premiums, and other liability premiums. 
The examination of an extensive set of 
risks that potentially could be influenced 
by punitive damages reveals no statistically 
significant deterrent effect. 
Uncertainty, Hindsight Bias,  
and New Products
As we saw, product liability costs are par-
ticularly likely to affect new products and 
to discourage new product introductions 
when liability costs are high. This differ-
ential burden on new products can be 
traced to a series of contributing factors 
in terms of how people perceive uncer-
tain risks, such as the hazards posed by 
new products, as compared to comparable 
risks from existing products for which the 
risks are better known.
One source of bias can be traced to 
tAble 1
Damage awards  
blockbuster punitive damages and the ratio of punitive damages to  
compensatory damages by industry type.
inDustRy inVolVeD numBeR of 
PunitiVe  
Damages 
aWaRDs
mean PunitiVe 
Damages  
(Millions of 
$2008)
mean  
ComPensatoRy 
Damages  
(Millions of 
$2008)
mean Ratio of 
PunitiVe to 
ComPensatoRy 
Damages
automobile 9 900.71 160.89 19.12
Cigarette1 5 10,240.92 2,078.87 11,125.31
energy, Chemical 25 1,531.59 701.61 90.09
finance, invest-
ment, insurance2 
23 546.33 222.45 59.20
Pharmaceuticals, 
Health Care 
16 503.69 109.29 40.98
Violent Crime 7 350.05 114.49 19.87
other 15 273.63 103.00 13.82
1 all columns exclude the Engle award. 
2 the mean ratio excludes garamendi v. altus Finance S.a., which has zero compensatory damages. 
Source: “the Changing landscape of blockbuster Punitive damages awards,” by alison F. del rossi and W. Kip Viscusi. 
american law and Economics review, Vol. 12 (2010), table 2.
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ambiguity aversion. In the classic Ellsberg paradox, people would 
prefer a known probability of winning a prize to an uncertain 
probability of the same magnitude. Subsequent work has shown 
that in the case of people facing losses, precisely understood 
probabilities of the loss are viewed as less harmful than less well 
understood probabilities of the same magnitude. While there are 
some exceptions to this pattern, particularly when probabilities 
are extremely close to zero or one, there is a well-established aver-
sion to facing imprecisely understood chances of a loss.
How this bias affects judgments is illustrated by experimental 
results I obtained for a sample of state court judges. The judges 
were asked, on behalf of a pharmaceutical company, to decide 
between two different drugs that could be used as contrast 
agents in a CAT scan. “Old Drug” had well-known properties 
and offered a 1:100,000 chance that the patient would suffer a 
fatal adverse reaction. “New Drug” served the same function, 
and based on clinical trials the best estimate of the expected 
magnitude of the risk was 1:150,000. However, the risk posed by 
New Drug was uncertain, as it could have been zero or as high as 
1:50,000. Even though New Drug was safer based on the expected 
level of risk, 57 percent of the respondents preferred to market 
Old Drug. In discussions with the judges regarding their prefer-
ence for the riskier but well known hazards of Old Drug, the 
judges indicated that there is less blame accorded to companies 
that market risky products with well-known hazards than for 
newly emerging risks.
Another perceptional factor that influences people’s assess-
ments of new products with uncertain properties is hindsight 
bias, which is the courtroom counterpart of Monday morning 
quarterbacking. Product liability claims, by their very nature, 
are filed after there has been an injury. At the time the product is 
marketed, the risk may be an uncertain prospect, but eventually 
the hazard becomes well known. Ideally, jurors should assess 
risks at the time the product is marketed. However, doing so 
is difficult from a psychological standpoint. Once the adverse 
event occurs, people tend to believe that the risk should have 
been anticipated. 
The tendency of people to overestimate the ex ante risk levels 
in legal contexts where there are identifiable victims was noted by 
Judge Frank Easterbrook in Carroll v. Otis Elevator, a case involving 
injury on a department store escalator:
The ex post perspective of litigation exerts a hydraulic force that dis-
torts judgment. Engineers design escalators to minimize the sum of 
construction, operation, and injury costs. Department stores, which 
have nothing to gain from maiming their customers and employees, 
willingly pay for cost-effective precautions…. Come the lawsuit, how-
ever, the passenger injured by a stop presents himself as a person, not 
a probability. Jurors see today’s injury; persons who would be injured 
if buttons were harder to find and use are invisible. Although wit-
nesses may talk about them, they are spectral figures, insubstantial 
compared to the injured plaintiff, who appears in the flesh.
Unfortunately, despite the well-established problems associ-
ated with hindsight bias, it is difficult for people to overcome 
such biases when judging risky behaviors. To test the influ-
ence of hindsight bias, I examined the performance of judges 
and jurors in a rail accident case in which different groups of 
respondents were asked either to make the corporate risk-taking 
decision ex ante or to judge the 
corporation’s decision after an 
accident had occurred. Judges 
performed better than jurors in 
terms of aligning their ex ante 
risk decisions and their judg-
ments after an accident had 
occurred. However, in the jury 
sample, participants favored 
the risk-taking behavior before the accident occurred, but after 
an accident occurred levied punitive damages because the initial 
decision to take the risk was regarded as reckless. 
Corporate Risk Analysis for Risky Products
Ideally, companies marketing potentially risky products should 
make some assessment of the risk posed by the product, the 
costs associated with improving product safety, and consumers’ 
likely valuations of products with different levels of safety to 
determine the efficient safety level for the product. At the most 
formal level, such an assessment would entail a benefit-cost 
analysis to determine the appropriate level of the risk. 
While such assessments may be desirable in theory, in prac-
tice they make the company very vulnerable. Having done a risk 
analysis and concluded that some risk-free or lower-risk variant 
of the product is not desirable, the company will appear to have 
knowingly made a reckless decision to expose consumers to 
risk if it turns out that there are product-related injuries. Thus 
such analyses could serve as a trigger for the award of punitive 
damages instead of being treated as a component of responsible 
corporate risk decisions.
Such fears of harsh judgments against corporate risk analy-
ses have been borne out in a variety of major product liability 
cases. The Ford Pinto cases involved drivers and passengers who 
suffered burn injuries while in the car. In response to a govern-
ment regulatory initiative from the U.S. Department of Trans-
portation, Ford had done a risk analysis with respect to moving 
the gas tank location, which would have affected the likelihood 
of burn injuries. Moving the tank to a safer location would have 
raised the product price and Ford concluded the change would 
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not pass a benefit-cost test. After the injuries occurred, jurors 
tended to compare the identifiable victims with the minor cost 
of relocating the tank, whereas the more appropriate compari-
son would have been the expected benefits and costs before the 
product was marketed.
Ford is not the only automobile company that has been pil-
loried for undertaking corporate risk analyses. In a blockbuster 
punitive damages award case against the Chrysler Corporation, 
jurors awarded punitive damages of $250 million because the 
company had done a risk analysis of an allegedly defective door 
latch in the Chrysler minivan. Chrysler maintained that the door 
latch did not increase the risk significantly and that altering the 
design was not worthwhile as it would have imposed a $100,000 
fixed retooling cost and a $0.50 per vehicle parts cost. The plain-
tiff’s attorneys portrayed Chrysler as a corporate villain simply for 
undertaking a risk analysis: “Chrysler officials at the highest level 
cold-bloodedly calculated that acknowledging the problem and 
fixing it would be more expensive, in terms of bad publicity and 
lost sales, than concealing the defect and litigating the wrongful 
death suits that inevitably would result.”
Experimental evidence indicates that undertaking a benefit-
cost analysis increases judgments against the corporation. In this 
study, jurors were told that the company followed the same proce-
dures used by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
in assessing safety devices and that the company also used the same 
value of statistical life (VSL) that the agency uses to value the safety 
improvements of alternative designs. The VSL amount is greater 
than the usual compensatory damages award for wrongful death, 
and so one would expect a finding of no liability. However, the 
mock juries levied punitive damages against the company. Thus 
responsible corporate risk analysis has the perverse effect of boost-
ing damages awards rather than reducing them.
Conclusion
Rather than creating an environment to foster safer products, 
product liability law often has adverse consequences. Some of 
the problems stem from the inherent nature of product risk 
decisions and the function of tort liability, while others may 
derive from individuals’ cognitive limitations and inability to 
think properly about balancing risk and cost. Thus it would 
be both incorrect and an oversimplification to blame all the 
ills on the tort liability system. That system functions reason-
ably well for many types of accidents, such as personal motor 
vehicle accidents. However, tort liability falls short with respect 
to products.
The first class of problems stems from the judgment biases 
of jurors. Because of loss aversion biases, jurors will impose 
excessive penalties on novel risks. Because of hindsight biases, 
jurors will believe incorrectly that the risk could have been 
anticipated. 
The second class of problems arises from excessive levels of 
damages. Although jurors tend to agree about what behavior 
is blameworthy, they are all over the map in assessing damages. 
Compensatory damages for economic loss are reasonably well 
defined. However, assessments of pain and suffering awards 
and punitive damages awards are fraught with error, no doubt 
in part because jurors are not given firm guidance with respect 
to how they should go about setting the level of these damages. 
The result is that there may be multi-billion-dollar blockbuster 
punitive damages awards, but these awards do not enhance 
safety because they are random, rare events. More generally, for 
large levels of punitive damages costs, there is in fact a counter-
productive effect of punitive damages that discourages product 
improvements and new product introductions. Exiting the mar-
ket altogether is often the desired course.
Third, firms are hampered in their efforts to reduce risks 
in an efficient manner by juror aversion to the measurement 
of risk. Companies that conduct risk analyses are vilified for 
intentionally endangering the public. When confronted with 
particular injury cases, the jury’s balancing abstracts from the ex 
ante expectations that necessarily guide corporate decisions and 
instead compare the identifiable victim with the product-specific 
cost of greater safety.
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